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VOICES OF THE GREAT MEN OF THE PAST: 
PERENNIAL DEBATES
Scott Nelson and José Colen
Many analyses of Raymond Aron’s books refer to his exceptionally sharp and subtle intelligence and stress his legacy as an educator, but neither his 
intellectual subtlety nor his role as a teacher are themselves enough to endow 
his work with a permanent value. Concerning this matter, Aron himself had 
no doubts: the contact with exceptional intellects who aspired to be considered 
at the same level as the “greats of the past” acted as reality’s alarm bell. Indeed, 
while Aron clearly had a great gift for lucid commentary on the philosophy of 
history, international relations, and political theory, he was also a generous and 
careful critic of many contemporary and past thinkers. He once remarked that 
he did not measure his thoughts against those great past thinkers, but preferred 
to cite them, to interpret them, and to continue their efforts.1 He has offered 
posterity some valuable praise and criticism of their ideas, to say nothing of his 
refining their methods and concepts with a view to analyzing his own time. As 
such, Aron’s insights into other thinkers often serve as an excellent introduction 
to their own works as well as Aron’s, and they are also a starting point for the 
analysis of today’s societies.
The chapters included in this section introduce us to some of the most impor-
tant conversations in which Aron participated. The texts in this section have 
been ordered chronologically, roughly according to the period a thinker entered 
Aron’s intellectual life. They will explore the issues that occupied Aron through-
out his lifetime: historical determinism, the nature of liberalism and democracy, 
and ethics and political action.
The reader will notice a recurring theme in this section and even, more gen-
erally, in the book as a whole. That theme is the primacy of the political. We 
shall often see in how many ways this crucial concept becomes manifest in Aron’s 
interaction with the thinkers discussed. For now, it is suffi  cient to point the 
reader to Aron’s own discussion of the primacy of the political. The primacy of 
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the political does not entail replacing a unilateral economic determinism, say, 
with an equally dogmatic and uninstructive political determinism; it does not 
refer to causal primacy. Nor does it suggest that our interest should be directed 
solely to political phenomena. What it suggests, rather, is that, in a world that 
is increasingly living the same history and speaking the same language of tech-
nology and economics, it is in the political realm that international actors’ dif-
ferences are most clearly displayed. More to the point, politics is a question of 
human existence and human ends, to which there is no single answer—perhaps 
save for on the horizon, as a regulatory idea. Behind every sociological analysis 
or sober piece of journalism stands Aron the philosopher.
Some of the thinkers discussed in this section had a more diffi  cult time than 
others did in dealing with this uncomfortable uncertainty about man’s destiny. 
At some point, though, they all confronted the fundamental questions about 
man’s nature and the society in which he acts in their own way. The thinker 
in whom changes in society had probably produced the most outrageous moral 
indignation was Karl Marx, Aron’s most important and infl uential “interlocutor.” 
Sylvie Mesure’s chapter examines Aron’s interpretation of Marx and Marxism. 
She draws on Aron’s writings about Marx, especially the lectures about Marx 
that Aron gave at the Sorbonne in the 1960s and at the Collège de France in 
the 1970s. Published in 2002 as Le Marxisme de Marx, these lectures illustrate 
Aron’s understanding of Marx and the various forms of Marxism that sprouted 
up in twentieth-century France. One of the major questions in Mesure’s chapter 
is how one should interpret an author. This becomes particularly troublesome 
with a writer such as Marx, who posed alternately as a prophet and as a scien-
tist, preaching revolution and then illustrating the inevitable course of history. 
Mesure shows us that Aron’s interpretation was in this regard far more hon-
est than the one-sided and diametrically opposed interpretations of Sartre and 
Althusser. Ignoring the importance Marx attributed to his economic analyses 
is just as egregious a disservice to the German thinker as postulating an epis-
temological break that negates all of his early works. In any case, regardless of 
the interpretation, there are certain problems with Marx’s economics, sociology, 
and philosophy of history, not the least of them being his historical determinism, 
buff ered by the primacy given to economic factors.
This is a mistake Montesquieu did not make, and if Aron has no problem 
thinking of himself as an intellectual descendant of this French liberal, it is 
because he found the latter’s respect for the plurality of causes deeply congenial 
to his own interests. Indeed, Aron declared Montesquieu the founder of soci-
ology—more specifi cally, of political sociology, as Miguel Morgado points out 
in his contribution. Morgado explores the similarities and diff erences between 
Aron’s and Montesquieu’s approaches to political and social regimes and how 
these regimes are unique in their respective time-periods. Montesquieu’s notion 
of “principle” is refl ected in Aron’s own analysis of political regimes as a method 
of elucidating the struggle between democratic virtue and the sense of compro-
mise that is at the heart of democratic politics. If a polity leans too far in either 
direction, it is prone to fall into corruption. Morgado concludes his chapter with 
a discussion of the prosaic nature of democracy.
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Any analysis of democracy must perforce lead us to another towering fi gure 
within the French liberal tradition: Alexis de Tocqueville. Aurelian Craiutu’s 
chapter looks at the intellectual affi  nity between Tocqueville and Aron, both 
of whom were “probabilists,” recognizing the essential importance of political 
phenomena, and both having had the misfortune of fi nding themselves aligned 
with the political center in a polarized society. Both saw democracy as one of 
the fundamental features of their times and both had to contend with the farci-
cal revolutions of 1848 and 1968 and the risible role played by the intellectuals 
involved. One of the most interesting aspects of this dialogue is the opportunity 
to see how Aron supplements Tocqueville’s insights with some of Marx’s obser-
vations in order to gain a clearer understanding of industrial society. To some 
extent, he surpasses both of their analyses in his emphasis on the advancement of 
science and industry, and increasing productivity.
However, Aron did not measure his ideas against those of the sociologists 
alone. As Craiutu notes, the primacy of the political also signifi es respect for lib-
erties (in the plural) and for choices. Aron spent a great deal of time and energy 
painstakingly scrutinizing the world in which he lived in order to demarcate 
the boundaries within which political choices could be made. Thus, we enter 
the domain of praxeology and Aron’s exchanges with two thinkers standing at 
opposite ends of the ethical spectrum: Machiavelli and Kant.
Diogo Pires Aurélio’s chapter deals with Aron, Machiavelli, and 
Machiavellianism. Had it not been for the Second World War, Aron would have 
published a book on Machiavelli and Machiavellianism. We only have the rem-
nants of this initially intended project, which were, however, collected and pub-
lished in 1993 as Machiavel et les tyrannies modernes. As Aurélio observes, these 
papers are less about Machiavelli than about the use to which “Machiavellian” 
doctrines have been put in the totalitarian era. Aron sees traces of the Florentine’s 
teachings in the politicians of his time as well as in the neo-Machiavellian schol-
ars, such as Gaetano Mosca, Robert Michels, James Burnham, and above all, 
Vilfredo Pareto, whose intellectual ties to Machiavelli are investigated in this 
chapter. Aurélio concludes with a discussion of democracy and Aron’s “moderate 
Machiavellianism.”
Pierre Hassner’s chapter treats Kant, the subject of some of Aron’s earliest phil-
osophical refl ections. For Aron the Kantian ideal of a unifi ed humanity always 
seemed to exist on the horizon, even if its imminent realization in this world was 
doubtful. Hassner probes the similarities between the two thinkers—their devo-
tion to the aspirations of the Enlightenment and the idea of Reason—though this 
connection was tempered by Aron’s acknowledgment of the tragedy of history 
and his uncertainty about the “cunning of nature” and man’s ability to predict 
the future. Hassner makes the intriguing observation that by examining Kant’s 
later writings we might more accurately speak of Kant becoming more Aronian 
than the other way around.
Machiavelli and Kant’s ethics are roughly analogous to two ethics later clas-
sifi ed by Max Weber: the ethic of responsibility and the ethic of conviction. 
In their chapter on Aron and Weber, Scott Nelson and José Colen investigate 
Raymond Aron’s ongoing debate with the German sociologist about ethics and 
S C O T T  N E L S O N  A N D  J O S É  C O L E N194
political action. They historically contextualize Weber’s ideas and make use of 
Aron’s numerous writings on Weber, especially two unpublished courses of his 
from the 1970s, Théorie de l’action politique and Jeux et enjeux de la politique, in 
which Aron reevaluates Weber’s two ethics. In the authors’ view Aron proves 
to have a more coherent understanding of political ethics because he is more 
attuned to the irreducible variety of political ends and the statesman’s need to 
fulfi ll faithfully both his obligations and the demands of his conscience.
* * *
The analysis of history is the key to addressing the central political question. 
Aron does so in the context of the confl icts that would be fought, as Nietzsche 
foresaw and as Nicolas Baverez has recalled, in the name of man’s philosophies 
and ideas. He has been justly called the “Thucydides of the twentieth century.” 
Nevertheless, the philosophical world of Plato and Aristotle is diff erent from 
that of Thucydides. When we open the latter’s history of the Peloponnesian 
War, the city is caught in a bloody war and we fi nd ourselves amid statesmen, 
military commanders and armies, citizens, and demagogues. Aron’s city—like 
Thucydides’ city—is in “motion.”2 One might think, however, that the Platonic 
approach was theoretical or philosophical, and Thucydides’ merely historical or 
descriptive. This would be unfair to Thucydides. As with Thucydides, Aron’s 
theory is based on a philosophy of history—it is a theory and sometimes even 
a philosophical theory, off ering models, both static and dynamic, with deep 
insights into the human condition and the ways of examining it. We can recall 
some of them briefl y: the “comparative method” which he used is capable of 
close phenomenological analysis and fi ne-grained distinctions, vividly bringing 
to light societies and political systems in their unity and diversity. He avoided the 
idealization of any actual or potential society as wholly just, free, and equal. He 
also never forgot values, goods, and the improvements that society and political 
institutions can pursue.
“Values” or goods we cherish—truth, justice, liberty, equality—are neither 
transcendental nor found in institutions, which are but imperfect arrangements. 
There is no perfectly just society: not even democracy is the natural system 
of the human species, but only one “perfectible artifact” or an “invention.” 
Aron could not describe the best regime in the abstract, ignoring social mech-
anisms and their results. One consequence of this approach is that he shared 
with Tocqueville the view that the best friend of democracy is not its fl atterer. 
Aron did not ignore the international scene—the modern nation is not isolated; 
there are people and groups aff ected here and now, sometimes tragically, by 
decisions made somewhere. His method leaves room for something beyond the 
rational method. People may not behave reasonably despite hypothetical social 
contracts, and all institutions represent choices related to a particular time and 
place. But Aron’s attention to practical particularities is never merely pragmatic 
or Machiavellian Realpolitik. There are many human activities that we do not 
understand without the use of standards (truth in science, beauty in art, the good 
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in ethics). Aron was aware that, even in a fi ctitious original state, people can have 
diff erent principles because values and norms are the application of “reason” to 
particular circumstances that we know empirically and must adapt to diff erent 
types of society; and, in the public sphere, the references are necessarily multiple, 
but not unrelated to a reasonable choice. Finally, not being himself a politician, 
he never ignored the role of the statesman, the recognition of which tends to be 
absent in current political theory.
Less than clear-cut theories may disappoint. But it is worth remembering that 
this is an old problem and that necessary simplifi cations do not always produce 
even good theories. Someone once said that Plato wrote the Republic, a city in 
the sky, to achieve a better city, and that Aristotle wrote the Politics just to make 
a better theory. However, it is certainly easier to live in the city of Aristotle than 
in the regime “according to prayer” of Plato. To Aron only possible political 
regimes can be compared among themselves, and the city in motion was what 
interested him above all. Only there can we fi nd the political speeches, propa-
ganda, confl ict, armies, voting, parties, and all the other elements that populate 
his theories. Can we have a comprehensive theory about the city in motion? Aron 
was attracted to those who had tried to discover one—Montesquieu, Clausewitz, 
and even Marx. But if the power and fertility of this “praxeological” vision can 
be shown, this can only be done through the study of Aron’s insights, hypoth-
eses, and innumerable concrete proposals when seen in light of his explicit or 
implicit theoretical framework. His own political judgments are in debt to his 
never-completely-fi nished-or-articulated theory. As Leo Strauss, who regarded 
Aron’s Peace and War as “the best book on the subject in existence,”3 said, “it is 
impossible to understand the biggest movement without understanding simulta-
neously the biggest rest,” and “one cannot understand the biggest war without 
understanding the biggest peace, the peace which, as it were, culminates in the 
biggest war.”4 That Aron’s refl ections on “the biggest rest” are necessarily incom-
plete may, in a sense, be a misfortune, but it is also a challenge that the present 
volume has attempted to address.
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